The Evidentiary Community in Ecuador: Between Regulatory Vacuum, Procedural Doctrine, and Judicial Practice

Abstract

Evidence is an essential element of the legal process, as it allows the facts in dispute to be reconstructed and decisions to be made in accordance with the law, thus guaranteeing effective judicial protection. Currently, the taking of evidence is no longer conceived solely as the rationalization of the evidence provided by the parties, but as an activity aimed at seeking the material truth. In this context, the principle of the community of evidence arises, according to which evidence validly incorporated into the process ceases to belong exclusively to the party presenting it and becomes part of a common pool that can benefit or harm any of the parties indiscriminately.

The analysis focuses on the status of this principle in the Ecuadorian legal system, highlighting the absence of express regulation and the consequences this has in judicial practice. Its development is examined on the basis of traditional and contemporary doctrines, as well as its normative basis in relation to constitutional principles such as due process, equality of arms, and the comprehensive assessment of evidence in accordance with the rules of sound criticism.

It also addresses the implicit application of the principle in Ecuadorian case law and judicial practice, highlighting disparate criteria that negatively affect legal certainty. Finally, it incorporates a comparative law study of Colombia, Argentina, and Spain, with the aim of identifying useful models and criteria for the Ecuadorian context.

Using a qualitative, legal-dogmatic, and analytical methodology, measures are proposed to strengthen the assessment of evidence and consolidate the recognition of the principle of community of evidence as a guarantee of substantive justice.